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NATURE OF CASE AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondents (hereinafter referred to as plaintiffs)
agree with the statement of facts as set forth in the brief of
appellant (hereinafter referred to as April).
ARGUMENT

I.
QUESTIONS RELATING TO THE REMOVAL OF RESTRICTIVE
LEGEND AND THE AWARD OF DAMAGES ARE RES JUDICATA

Appellant argues under its present Point I. that "The
trial court awarded plaintiffs inconsistent remedies and unjustly enriched them.'1

This argument was presented to and

rejected by this court on the prior appeal.^

Thereafter this

argument was again presented to and rejected by this court in
April's petition for rehearing.^

The petition for rehearing

was denied.

1.

April's Brief, p.5
"Plaintiffs are to receive an amount in damages virtually
equivalent to what they would have received had they sold
their shares in the public offering. The trial court also
told plaintiffs that they could keep their shares. Thus,
plaintiffs are to receive the proceeds from the sale of
their stock without actually selling that stock."

2.

For comparison purposes we quote from April's prior brief,
p. 19
"Thus, plaintiffs will now have their stock without restrictive legend, making the stock fully marketable. Should the
price increase and should plaintiffs decide to sell, they
would be entitled to whatever benefit they could obtain
from the value of the stock. But, of course, plaintiffs
are not satisfied with just the stock. They also want to
keep the stock and obtain damages for the failure to include the shares in the 1972 public offering."

3.

For comparison purposes we quote from April's Brief on
petition for rehearing (ps.12-16) which it reiterates in its
present brief (as footnote 3, ps.10-13) almost verbatim:
III.

The Court's opinion awards plaintiffs inconsistent remedies and unjustly enriches them.

This Court has awarded plaintiffs damages because
their shares were not sold in the 1972 public offering.
Though this Court's opinion does not deal with the issue,
plaintiffs are still the owners of their shares and are
still entitled to possession of them. If the price for
these shares should rise, plaintiffs will be able to take
advantage of that price increase by selling their shares.
They will thus enjoy the double benefit of the sale of
their stock and a substantial damage award. The law does
not permit double recovery.
-2-

April argues under its present Point II., "Plaintiffs
are foreclosed from recovering damages because of a ruling of
the trial court from which plaintiffs took no appeal.11

The

crux of plaintiffs1 prior appeal was that damages should have
been awarded.

This court's prior decision was that damages

should have been awarded, which is res judicata.

They are entitled to their shares without restrictive
legend; they are not entitled to the double recovery
afforded by money damages.
Plaintiffs1 claims are perhaps best analogized to
the law of sales. Plaintiffs claim that they are entitled to what they would have received had their shares
been included in the 1972 offering; they are seeking the
equivalent of specific performance of an action for the
price. If they are asking for what is in effect specific
performance, plaintiffs must give up the ownership of
their shares. The same is true of action for the price.
Under both the Uniform Commercial Code and pre-Code law
an action for the price is only possible where the seller has delivered goods to the defaulting bujrer or the
risk of loss has passed from the seller to the buyer.
See U.C.C. §2-709. A seller is not entitled to sue for
the sales price and at the some time keep the goods to
be sold. The obvious reason for this rule is to prevent
the seller from being unjustly enriched by being paid for
goods which he is going to keep.
In Murray v. Americare Medical Designs, Inc. 123 Ga.
App. 557, 181 S.E.2d 871 (Ga. App. 1971)7 the plaintiff,
who had supplied plans and supervised construction of a
medical building being erected by the defendants, brought
suit for breach of the construction agreement.
On a petition for rehearing after judgment for the
plaintiff the issue concerned the ownership of certain
cabinets and hardware items to be placed in the building.
The court found that the evidence as to the location and
ownership of the cabinets was conflicting. It resolved
the dilemma by stating that the defendant would, by paying
the judgment, be entitled to take possession of the cabinets and other hardware items. As the Court stated:

-3-

None of these issues is properly before the court.
II.
INCONSISTENT REMEDIES WERE NOT AWARDED
Plaintiffs were awarded specific performance of the
agreement that they should have unrestricted stock and were
also awarded damages for having been prevented from selling the stock.

Those awards are not inconsistent.

As

stated in 71 Am.Jur, 2d Specific Performance, §216 p.277,
"A court of equity, having jurisdiction for the purpose of
specifically enforcing performance of a contract, has full
jurisdiction, in addition to decreeing specific performance,
to award compensation for delay of the defendant in the performance of the contract, as, for example, for loss of rents
and profits resulting from delay in the conveyance of land,
for loss resulting from delay in the purchase of corporate
stock, or for business losses resulting from delay in the
performance of the contract by the defendant.11
April argues that, "Plaintiffs are to receive an amount
in damages virtually equivalent to what they would have

M

It is obvious, however, that when this
defendant pays off the judgment against
him representing damages equivalent to
the purchase price of the casework and
hardware he becomes by that fact the
owner of the merchandise and entitled to
whatever value it may have, since to allow the plaintiff or the manufacturer
full payment plus goods involved would
result in an unjust enrichment. In this
connection see Code Ann. 109A-2-709. [The
Georgia Provision of Section 2-709 of the
Uniform Commercial Code]." (181 S.E.2d at 873-874.)
-4-

received had they sold their shares in the public offering."^
April then concludes that, since they still have their shares,
"...plaintiffs are to receive the proceeds from the sale of
their stock without actually selling that stock."^

The fallacy

with that argument is that the reason the amount of damages
resulting from not being able to sell was "virtually11 the
value of the shares, is that during the period April refused
to recognize the validity of the shares, or their tradeability,
the value of the shares declined "virtually11 to zero.

The full

value of the shares at time of judgment, 87 1/2 cents, was deducted in computation of damages.

The coincindence that the

shares became nearly worthless does not create a double recovery situation.

There is no more double recovery here than

there would have been had the stock only declined slightly and
an amount in damages, much less than the equivalent value of
the shares,had been awarded.

So long as the actual value of

the shares at time of judgment was deducted, whatever it may
have been, there is no double recovery.
If there had been an award of the value of the shares, because April had converted them, then plaintiffs1 retention of
shares would have constituted a double recovery.

Plaintiffs

profferred to treat the shares as having been converted.
April objected thereto, and the trial court refused the proffer.^

4.

April's Brief, p.5 (emphasis added)

5.

April's Brief, p.6

6.

Aprilfs Brief, p.5

7.

(R-381)
-5-

Had it been accepted, plaintiffs would then have received an
additional award of damages of 87 1/2 cents per share and
would no longer have their shares.

Instead, that amount was

deducted from the damage award and plaintiffs kept their
shares.
III.
DAMAGES WERE PROPERLY AWARDED
April argues that plaintiffs should have appealed the
trial court's refusal of their proffer to surrender their
shares and to recover their value in a claim for conversion.°
April is confusing the recovery of damages for decline in
value with recovery of damages for conversion of the remaining value of the shares.

The latter has never been awarded.

Plaintiffs still have their shares, worth 87 1/2 cents, as of
the date of the prior decree, and they have not been paid
87 1/2 cents.

Therefore, there was no need to appeal.

April asserts that, MIf defendant has to pay for plaintiffs' stock, it should not be deprived of that stock..."
April has not paid for the stock.

It refused to pay the

87 1/2 cents value and objected to plaintiffs' tender of the
shares into court.
April, in this appeal, is attempting a second petition
for rehearing of the former decision.

8.

April's Brief, p.13

9.

April's Brief, p.15

-6-

This court's decree

"...remanded for the entry of judgment against defendant for
damages for breach of contract, which damages would be the
difference between the present market value and the highest
price obtainable during the period of the breach...11 (emphasis
added).

That was done.

The deduction of the present market

value precludes any unjust enrichment.
April's argument that the stock may appreciate in value
and plaintiffs would then be unjustly enriched is not persuasive.

The stock may also decline.

The Utah cases cited by April

on election of remedies

are distinguishable because they do involve election of the
inconsistent remedies of either rescinding or of enforcing
the contract.

Plaintiffs here sued to specifically enforce

the contract and to recover damages for breach, which remedies are not inconsistent.
The Colorado case cited by April, Thornburg v. Homestead
Minerals Corporation, 513 P.2d 219 (Colo. App. 1973), ll is
only an appellate court opinion.

Furthermore, it is distin-

guishable because in that case, in a prior action, the plaintiff had sued only to get clear title to the shares and not
for damages.

The corporation asserted plaintiff was thereby

estopped from later claiming damages.

The appellate court

10.

April's Brief, p.6, Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Universal CI.T. Credit Corp., 4 Utah 2d 155, 289 P.2d 1045
(1955); Rogers v. United Western Minerals Co., 8 Utah
2d 1, 326 P.2d 1019 (1958); Midvale Motors, Inc. v.
Sanders, 19 Utah 2d 403, 432 P.2d 37 (1967)

11.

April's Brief, p.7

-7-

said that, MBy asking only for clear title in the first action, she thereafter assumed the risk of market fluctuation."
April cites an appeals court decision from Georgia, 12
Murray v. Americare Medical Designs, Inc., 123 Ga. App. 557,
181 S.E.2d 871 (1971), which simply held that a supplier was
not entitled to both the value of materials supplied and the
return of the materials furnished because it would result in
unjust enrichment.

With this we agree, but plaintiffs here

are not unjustly enriched because they have not recovered the
value of the shares.
April cites Owen v. Merts, 240 Ark. 1080, 405 S.W. 2d
273 (1966)13 for the proposition that one cannot recover both
specific performance and damages. We would agree with that
proposition where such remedies are inconsistent as they
sometimes are.

In Owen v. Merts, the plaintiffs were suing

to acquire shares of stock, rather than to sell them or to
make them saleable.
acquire stock.

In our case, plaintiffs did not seek to

They already had it. A buyer may have an

election of remedies, to sue for damages or for specific performance of the contract of sale.

Here, instead of wanting

to acquire shares, plaintiffs wanted to sell the shares they
already had and which April refused to allow to be traded.
Plaintiffs here asked the court to make their shares saleable.
The inconsistency claimed in Owen v. Merts of wanting to acquire shares and get damages also is not present.

12.

April's Brief, p.11, footnote 3

13.

April's Brief, p.8
-8-

Plaintiffs

here seek the right to sell their shares and damages because
April prevented a sale, which are entirely consistent.
Owen v. Merts relies upon Virginia Public Service Co. v.
Steindler, 166 Va. 686, 187 S.E.353 (1936). 14
facts are also distinquishable.

The Virginia

There, plaintiffs sought

and were awarded not only registration of their shares but
also past accrued dividends and interest thereon.

The court

there found that it would be inconsistent to rule that plaintiffs were owners as of a previous date and thus entitled to
benefits of ownership, and not be subject to detriments of
such ownership, such as value fluctuation.

Here, no dividends

are involved.
Further, in Virginia the court relied upon the fact that
plaintiffs could have sold at any time, saying the alleged
loss was ''entirely predicated on the date on which complainants might have sold the stock according to their whim,11 and
that plaintiffs could have sold their shares at any time including a time prior to trial, and that the claimed damages were
therefor uncertain and speculative.

Here, plaintiffs could

not sell their shares.
The court in Virginia was considering two alternatives
for plaintiffs, either a suit for conversion, in which event
the company would become the owner of the shares and plaintiffs
would be awarded damages, or a suit for specific performance

14.

April's Brief, p.9

-9-

to have shares registered, in which event plaintiffs would
become the owners, and said, "It is elementary that the complainants were not entitled to both the stock and its value."
The distinction is that here, plaintiffs have not been awarded the value of the shares.

They did not sue for conversion.

The value of the shares was deducted from the award.

The

action was to force April to perform its agreement to make
the shares tradeable and for damages because they had not
been able to sell their shares.
Unlike the Virginia situation where plaintiffs could
have sold at any time, plaintiffs here still haven't been
able to sell.

Not only is the relief granted here not in-

consistent, both facets of the relief granted are essential
for adequate recovery.

If plaintiffs had to elect between

an award for decline in value of shares and an award that
the shares be made tradeable, they would not obtain full
relief.

They would wind up with shares of no value because

they could not be sold.

As stated in 71 Am.Jur. 2d Specific

Performance, §216, p.278 "...equity may, when decreeing
specific performance, award pecuniary compensation along
with specific performance when the decree would otherwise
not give complete and full relief,..."
Professor Moore recognizes that both specific performance and damages may be awarded.

-10-

He states, "...in a suit

for specific performance the plaintiff may demand
1
(1) that defendant be required specifically to
perform said agreement, (2) damages in the sum of
one thousand dollars,...!
Footnote 9. Demand (1) for specific performance is a claim for equitable relief;
and demand (2) for $1,000 in damages is
incidental and cumulative to demand (1)
and is within equitable jurisdiction. "
This court, in its prior decision in this case, recognized that complete recovery should be granted by ordering
the award of damages in addition to the removal of the
restrictive legend.

Prior to that decision this court had

recognized that both specific performance and damages could
be decreed.

In Johnson v. Jones, 109 U.92, 164 P.2d 893,

896, this court, in a case wherein specific performance was
awarded to a contract buyer of a duplex as well as damages
for loss of rental from failure to convey, said:
The third general argument is that the court
erred in awarding damages for loss of rentals in
an amount of the entire rental value of the property, even if specific performance could be
decreed. In view of what we have said hereinabove, this contention is unsound, for if appellant
had performed, the respondents would either have enjoyed the actual possession of the apartment occupied
by appellant and collected the rent from the tenants
occupying the other apartment, or if both apartments
had been rented they would have collected the rent
on both.

15.

Moore's Federal Practice 2A, 1(8.18, ps. 1802-1804

-11-

IV.
APRIL CANNOT NOW OBJECT TO
THE AWARD OF SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE
The original decree ordered April to remove the restrictive legend, but did not award damages.
from the refusal to award damages.

Plaintiffs appealed

April did not appeal from

the order that the legends be removed.

Both the award of

damages and order to remove legends are now res judicata.

V.
THERE IS NO VIOLATION OF DUE PROCESS
There is no double recovery, hence there is no violation
of due process.

VI.
PREJUDGMENT INTEREST AWARD IS NOT EXCESSIVE
April argues that prejudgment interest should run only
from the date of this court's ruling.
be post-judgment interest.

16.

April's Brief, p.16

-12-

Such interest would

April quotes from the early case of Fell v. Union Pacific
Railway Co,, 32 Utah 101, 88 Pac. 1003 (1907), which allowed
prejudgment interest.-^

Plaintiffs have no quarrel with the

holding in that case, but cannot go along with April's conclusion that, because interest would vary depending upon amount
of deduction for the residual value of the shares at time of
judgment, it should not be awarded.

The amount of prejudg-

ment interest is never ascertained until date of judgment
because the amount thereof would vary depending upon the
date of trial.

The residual value was ascertainable at any

given judgment date.

The fact that it was not ascertained

until the court entered judgment because only then can the
credited residual value be determined, should not bar the
award of interest.

The rationale of the rule allowing

interest is that plaintiffs should, as nearly as possible,
be placed in a position comparable to that in which they
would have been had the wrong not occurred.

As stated in

Fell,
Is there any reason why a person sustaining injury
and damage to his property from the negligent act
of another should not receive just what he has lost
as nearly as this may be accomplished in a court of
justice? If a person's property is destroyed or
damaged, why is he not entitled to be compensated
to the full extent of its value in money so that he
may replace the same with other property of a like

17.

April's Brief, p.16

-13-

nature? If on the day of its injury or destruction
he restores or replaces it with his own money, why
is he not entitled to interest on that money to the
date of repayment? If he had loaned the money to
some one, he certainly would be entitled to interest,
and, if he borrowed it from some one, he would likely
have to pay interest for its use. By being awarded
legal interest, therefore, he is simply placed in
statu quo, and nothing short of this is full compensation, and that is just what the law aims to accomplish. Is it an answer to say that the damages are
unliquidated, and therefore interest is not to be
allowed? This, to our minds, is no reason at all
in case of injury to or destruction of property.1°
It would be unreasonable to say that if the stock had
become worthless, and therefore there were no residual value
with which April was credited, that April should be exhonorated from paying interest.
The ultimate goal of making plaintiffs whole should be
achieved.

Plaintiffs are only made whole by awarding them

interest for the period during which they could have been
using the net proceeds of sale of the stock.
All of the cases on which April relies in arguing that
interest should not be awarded, actually award prejudgment
interest.

If any language used in the decisions indicated

recovery of interest should be allowed under the facts of
the particular case, that is not a holding that interest should
not be awarded under other facts, such as those in this case.
Any such language would be dictum.

18.

Fell v. Union Pacific Railway Co., P.88 ps. 1005-06

-14-

April is really arguing that plaintiffs should not recover interest because the damages were unliquidated until
date of judgment.

Such contention has been rejected by Fell

and by all other subsequent decisions relied upon by April.
In Fell the court did not say that prejudgment interest
should commence to run from the date the amount of damages
is actually ascertained.

Rather, it said that damages must

be ascertained as of a particular time by applying fixed rules
of evidence and known standards of value.

Here, the particular

time that damages were ascertained was at the time of the entry
of judgment.

The Fell decision was differentiating between a

situation on the one hand in which damages had all accrued at
time of judgment and on the other hand, a situation in which
post-judgment damage would be accruing, compensation for which
was to be included in the award.

In the latter case prejudg-

ment interest would not be allowed.
latter situation.

Plaintiffs are not in the

The court said,

The true test to be applied as to whether interest
should be allowed before judgment in a given case
or not is, therefore, not whether the damages are
unliquidated or otherwise, but whether the injury
and consequent damages are complete and must be
ascertained as of a particular time and in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and known
standards of value, which the court or jury must
follow in fixing the amount, rather than be guided
by their best judgment in assessing the amount to
be allowed, for past as well as for future injury,
or for elements that cannot be measured by any
fixed standards of value...As the case at bar falls

-15-

clearly within the rule where the amount is computed as of a fixed time, and in accordance xvdth
fixed rules of evidence as to value, the court
did not err in computing, on the amount of damages
found, interest at the legal rate.^
In Uinta Pipeline Corp. v. White Superior Co.,

U.2d

546 P.2d 885, 887, this court's most recent decision on prejudgment interest, it is clearly shown that the important
criterion is whether or not damages are complete at the time
of trial.

The court quoted that language of Fell allowing

interest except where damages are continuing and may reach
beyond the time of trial.

If complete at time of trial, and

if amounts can be computed at the time of trial, interest
should be awarded.

The court in Uinta after quoting Fell

said:
In the class of cases, therefore, where the damage
is complete, and the amount of the loss is fixed
as of a particular time, there is--there can be-no reason why interest should be withheld merely
because the damages are unliquidated. There are
certain cases of unliquidated damages where interest cannot be allowed. In all personal injury
cases, cases of death by wrongful act, libel,
slander, false imprisonment, malicious prosecution,
assault and battery, and all cases where the damages
are incomplete and are peculiarly within the province of the jury to assess at the time of the trial,
no interest is permissible. But this is so because
the damages are continuing and may even reach beyond
the time of trial.
There can be no question about the propriety of
allowing interest for the destruction of personal
property prior to judgment where value can be
measured by facts and figures. In the instant
matter the cost of rebuilding the compressor stage

19.
20.

Fell v. Union Pacific Railway Co., supra, p.1007
An even more recent case allowing prejudgment interest
because the amount due was ascertainable is Jack B.
Parson Construction Co. v. Utah
U
, 552 P.2d 107.
-16-

was subject to computation. Therefore it was error for the court to fail to award interest from
the time of destruction.
Applying the above rationale, prejudgment interest should
be awarded because:
1.

The damage was complete at date of judgment and no

damages are to be allowed for future injury or for elements
that cannot be measured by fixed standards of value.
2.

The amount of loss is fixed as of date of judgment.

3.

Damages are not peculiarly within the province of

the trier of fact to assess at time of judgment, but are
awarded in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and known
standards of value.
4.

Value can be measured by facts and figures and

damages are subject to computation.
5.

Plaintiffs can only be made whole by an award of

interest on the sums they should have been able to realize
by sale of the shares at the time of April's public offering.
CONCLUSION
This court has already adjudicated the issues now raised
by April other than the award of interest.

Utah's long line

of cases awarding interest, regardless of whether or not
damages were liquidated, support the award of interest here.
The judgment should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
^ / ^ - ^ ^

^
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v

^

John W. Lowe
/Brayton, Lowe & Hurley

Attorneys for Respondents

